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Abstract
Advocates of the counterfactual approach to causal inference argue that race isn't a cause.
I object that their argument is invalid and that its key premise is unwarranted. I also criticize
the criterion, which I call `Holland's rule', the counterfactual approach relies on to distinguish
causes from non-causes. Finally, I argue that racial discrimination cannot be causally explained
unless one assumes race to be a cause. I conclude that the view that race is not a cause lacks
support and that there are good reasons to adopt the opposite view that race is a cause.
1 Introduction
Scientists in many disciplines (economics, epidemiology, etc.) routinely treat race as a cause.
Economists who study labor market discrimination, for instance, commonly build models involving
race as an independent variable and give a causal interpretation of the coecient attached to it.1
Are scientists who treat race as a cause fundamentally confused? Do policies based on their con-
clusions rest on shoddy evidence? This is what leading advocates of the counterfactual approach to
causal inference (henceforth `CFA') claim, arguing that since race is an \immutable characteristic"
of individuals, one cannot coherently treat it as a cause.
After a brief introduction to the CFA (x2), I present the argument against race being a cause
(x3). I then raise two objections to it (x4) and proceed to sketch a positive argument for race being
a cause (x5). I conclude that advocates of the CFA lack justication for denying race the status of
cause, and that there are good reasons to adopt the opposite view that race is a cause (x6).
2 The counterfactual approach
The CFA, rst introduced by Rubin (1974), is the dominant approach to causal inference in statistics
and in many social sciences. It has roots in the work of Fisher and Neyman on agricultural
experiments.
1See e.g. (Kahn and Sherer, 1988) for a classic example that is representative of many studies in labor economics.
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When only one cause is considered, counterfactual causal models essentially have the following
components:2
 A population of units i 2 U
 A binary causal exposure variable D taking value di = 1 when i is exposed to the cause (is
in the `treatment' state) and di = 0 when i is not (is in the `control' state).
 Two potential outcome variables Y 1 and Y 0, where y1i represents the value of the eect for i
when i is exposed to the cause and y0i , the value of the eect for i when i is not exposed to
the cause.
The individual-level causal eect (ICE) of D for i is typically dened as follows:
i = y
1
i   y0i
This causal eect is equal to the dierence between the value of the eect when i is exposed to
the cause and the value of the eect when i is not. Since a given unit cannot be both exposed to
the cause and not exposed to it at once, only one of y1i and y
0
i can be observed for any unit. If i
is exposed to the cause, the value of y1i is observable while the value of y
0
i is counterfactual: It is
the value the eect would have taken had i not been exposed to the cause; hence the name of the
approach. Because only one of y1i and y
0
i can be observed, i cannot be observed either. Holland
dubs this the \fundamental problem of causal inference" (1986, 947).
There are various solutions to this problem, both in experimental and in observational contexts.
These solutions provide techniques for estimating the ICE and other causal eects, or parameters,
built upon it. My concern here is not with the problems that race might raise for the application
of these estimation techniques.3 It is, rather, with the problems that race allegedly raises for the
very denition of causal eects, and of the ICE in particular.
3 The argument against race being a cause
The argument developed by leading advocates of the CFA against race being a cause can be
reconstructed as follows:
1. Race is a necessary property of units
2. If a unit is of race r, then it is impossible for it to have been of another race r0 (from 1)
3. Counterfactuals of the form `Had i been of race r0 instead of r, then. . . ' cannot be (non-
vacuously) true (from 2).
2I adopt the terminology and notation from (Morgan and Winship, 2007).
3Rubin (1986; 2011) argues that estimating the causal eects of race is dicult enough to warrant its dismissal
as a cause. I agree with Heckman (2005) that arguments of this kind conate denition and estimation: That it is
dicult to estimate the causal eect of race does not warrant the conclusion that it is not a cause.
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4. The ICE of race is undened (from 3 and the denition of ICE).
) Race is not a cause (from 4).
Let me illustrate this argument. Assume that there are only two races, that D represents race,
and that di = 1 when i is White and di = 0 when i is Black. To say that race is a necessary
property, \immutable characteristic" (Greiner and Rubin, 2011), or \attribute" (Holland, 1986,
955) of units is to say that if di = 1 (resp. 0), then it could not have been the case that di = 0
(resp. 1). Because this is so, counterfactuals of the form `Had it been the case that di = 0 instead
of di = 1, then the value of Y
0 for i would have been y0i ' cannot be non-vacuously true when di = 1.
Because no such counterfactual can be non-vacuously true, the causal eect of race is undened,
and this regardless of what eect the variables Y 1 and Y 0 represent (wages, education, etc.).4
In Holland's words, \attributes of units [like race] are not the types of variables that lend
themselves to plausible states of counterfactuality." (2003, 14, emphasis original) He adds: \Because
I am a White person, it would be close to ridiculous to ask what would have happened to me had
I been Black." (ibid.) And because the causal eect of race cannot be dened unless there is a
non-vacuously true answer to such a counterfactual query, Holland concludes that race is not a
cause.
The consequences of this view are important. If race is not a cause, then as Greiner and
Rubin point out, \attempts to infer the causal eects of such traits [as race] are incoherent." (2011,
775) Holland goes further by claiming that, \Attributing cause to RACE is merely confusing and
unhelpful in an area where scientic study is already dicult" and that, \Obscuring [the topics of
discrimination and bias] with simplistic calculations that do not attend to the proper role of RACE
in a causal study helps no one." (2003, 24)
So, do the many scientists who treat race as a cause waste time and resources on incoherent
studies that only obscure important topics like racial discrimination? I do not believe so and
develop two objections to the argument against race being a cause.
4 Against the argument against race being a cause
4.1 The argument is invalid
The most straightforward objection to the argument presented in x2 is that its conclusion does not
follow from its premises. The fact that the ICE of race is undened only entails that race is not a
cause if the following premise is added to the argument:
40. For all x, if x is a cause, then its ICE is dened.
4The same point applies mutatis mutandis to other causal eects dened in the CFA, e.g. the average causal eect
dened over U as E[Y 1]  E[Y 0]. Because ICE is the fundamental causal eect for the CFA, however, I focus on it
in the present paper.
3
If one adds this premise, then the argument is valid. There are good reasons, however, to believe
that this premise is false, i.e. there are good reasons to think that some genuine causes cannot be
handled by the CFA.
Holland himself claims, for instance, that scholastic achievement in primary school cannot be
treated as a cause of the choice of secondary school by the CFA (1986, 955). Setting aside the
question of the justication for this claim, the right conclusion to draw here is not that scholastic
achievement is not a cause of school choice: There are good reasons to think that how well a
student does in primary school has an eect on what secondary school she chooses to attend (e.g.
by determining what schools she's admitted to). Rather, the conclusion to draw is that some
genuine causes cannot be handled by the CFA, and so that premise 40 is false.
This conclusion is bolstered by the existence of frameworks for causal inference, e.g. Ragin's
qualitative comparative analysis framework (1987), that do not rely on counterfactuals to dene
causal eects and which can thus treat variables whose ICE is undened as causes.
4.2 Why believe premise 1?
How do advocates of the CFA justify the claim that race is an attribute, i.e. a necessary property,
of units?5 Their justication for this claim derives entirely from an application of what I will call
`Holland's rule' (or `HR'). According to HR,
If the variable could be a treatment in an experiment (even one that might be impossible
to actually pull o due to ethical or practical issues), then the variable is [. . . ] correctly
called a causal variable. (2003, 9, emphasis original)
It is important to note that, for Holland, attributes and causal variables form a partition of the
set of properties of a unit: If a property is not a causal variable, then it is an attribute. Holland
claims that race could not be a treatment in an experiment and, applying HR, he thus concludes
that it is not a causal variable but, rather, an attribute (ibid.).6 Greiner and Rubin agree and
invoke \the impossibility of manipulating such traits [as race] in a way analogous to administering
a treatment in a randomized experiment" (2011, 775) as one of the sources of the incoherence of
studies purporting to estimate the eect of race.
There are two important problems with HR. First, it is the wrong rule for advocates of the
CFA to follow. According to the CFA, for the ICE of D on i to be dened, there must be some
counterfactual state in which i is not exposed to D, assuming that i actually was exposed to D.
5Glymour has objected to Holland that, \If counterparts [in the sense of (Lewis, 1968)] are conceivable { and why
not? { then counterfactuals that violate identity conditions are intelligible, and if counterfactuals are intelligible, then
causal relations are as well." (Glymour, 1986) Holland, however, can answer this objection by saying that the problem
with attributes is not that they engender counterfactuals which violate identity conditions, but that they engender
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. In other words, Holland could answer that though counterparts are
conceivable, no counterpart of a White unit can be, e.g., Black. Because race is a necessary property, all counterparts
of a White unit also are White.
6Note that Holland's argument is fallacious given the way HR is formulated: It denies the antecedent of HR and
infers the negation of its consequent. I'm here adopting a charitable reading according to which it is necessary for a
property of units to be a causal variable that it be a treatment in some possible experiment.
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In other words, it must be possible for i not to have been exposed to D. But why think that the
possibility of such a state requires the possibility of an experiment resulting in it being the case that
i is not exposed to D? To hold this view is to hold the implausible view that it is possible that p
only if it is possible for there to be an experiment of the right kind resulting in it being the case that
p. The right slogan for the CFA thus isn't \No causation without [some hypothetical experimental]
manipulation" (Holland, 1986, 959) but, rather, `No causation without counterfactual states'. This
slogan is less catchy but more faithful to the way the CFA denes causal eects (e.g. the ICE).
One might object that HR was intended by Holland not as a strict rule but as a heuristic. It
is true that he prefaces his presentation of HR by saying that, \There is no cut-and-dried rule for
deciding which variables in a study are causal and which are not." (2003, 9) It should be noted,
however, that despite this caveat, Holland does apply HR as a \cut-and-dried" rule, since he takes
the supposed violation of HR by race to be sucient to establish the conclusion that race is an
attribute and so cannot be a cause (op. cit., 10). It should also be noted that HR fares no better
as a heuristic rule than it does as a strict rule. I have claimed above that the possibility of an
experiment resulting in i not being exposed to D is not necessary for it to be possible that i is
not exposed to D. If so, however, then there is no reason to take the inconceivability of such an
experiment to be a reliable guide to the impossibility of a state in which i is not exposed to D.
The second issue is that HR is vague { What kinds of experiments are admissible? What does
it mean to say that a variable could be a treatment in an experiment? { and that, as a result, it is
unclear that it is genuinely impossible for there to be an experiment in which race is the treatment.
Indeed, let me argue against this impossibility claim by describing a hypothetical randomized
experiment in which race is the treatment:7 Assume that the race ri of i is a function ri = f(bi; ei)
of biological (bi) and environmental (including social and cultural) factors (ei).
8 Imagine that values
of bi and ei, and thus also of ri, are randomly assigned to embryos 30 days after conception. The
biological factors are assigned via genetic engineering and the environmental factors are assigned
by swapping embryos between mothers.9
This experiment has not been carried out, is morally objectionable, and might be practically
impossible given present science and technology. But this does not mean that this experiment is
impossible. Indeed, the experiment described seems to be nomologically possible, i.e. carrying it out
would not seem to require the violation of any laws of nature. This experiment also claries what
the antecedents of counterfactuals of the form `Had i been of race r0 instead of r, then. . . ' claim.
The race of i would have been dierent just in case i had been randomly assigned a combination
of values of bi and ei giving rise to a value r
0 of ri that diers from its actual value r.
7Note that HR does not require the relevant hypothetical experiments to be randomized. I am oering more than
is required here.
8What the relative weights of bi and ei are is no concern of mine. If you think that race is entirely determined
by biological factors, then give zero weight to ei; and if you think that race is entirely determined by environmental
(including social) factors, then give zero weight to bi.
9Note that this experiment will not work if, among the biological factors represented by bi, are `genealogical'
properties of i (e.g. who i's parents are). Thus, if you think that races are biological groups unied by genealogical
relations (see e.g. Hardimon 2012), then you should think that the experiment described above does not randomly
assign race.
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It thus seems that, despite what Holland and Greiner and Rubin assume, it is possible for race
to be a treatment in an experiment, even a randomized experiment, and so it is not the case that
race violates HR. Even if HR was the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow (a view I have
argued against), then, its application to the case of race would not support the claim that race is
an attribute of units rather than a causal variable, i.e. it would not support premise 1. So, not only
is the argument against race being a cause invalid, as I have argued in x4.1, but its key premise
also lacks proper support.
5 A positive argument for race being a cause: Explaining racial discrimination
Consider an imaginary society in which there are two exclusive and exhaustive racial groups, A
and B. Assume that in this society there is a wage gap between As and Bs: As receive wages
that are uniformly 30% lower than the wages received by Bs occupying equivalent jobs. Assume,
further, that all the units in the population, be they A or B, are perfectly homogeneous regarding
the causes of wages (other than, possibly, race), e.g. they received the same degree from the same
school, they have the same number of years of experience, they have the same IT skills, they have
the same interpersonal skills, they work equally hard, they have the same preferences regarding
wages, etc. Assume, nally, that there is only one employer in this society, and that this employer
xes the wages of the workers hired.
What is the mechanism generating this wage gap, i.e. what causally explains the fact that As
receive wages that are 30% lower than those of Bs? The seemingly obvious answer is that As
receive lower wages precisely because they are As and because the employer believes that the work
of As is worth 30% less than that of Bs. In other words, what causes As to receive lower wages is
the fact that they are As combined with the fact that the employer believes the work of As to be
worth 30% less than that of Bs.
This commonsensical causal explanation is unavailable to somebody who claims that race is not
a cause. If being an A is not a cause, then being an A cannot, in combination with the employer's
belief about the worth of the work of As, cause one to receive lower wages. But, then, what causally
explains the wage gap between As and Bs? Let me consider two alternative ways one might answer
this question below.10
The rst alternative answer, defended by Holland (2003), consists in claiming that what causally
explains the wage gap is not the racial dierence between As and Bs but, rather, the (racially)
discriminatory nature of the society I described. This answer, however, faces an immediate diculty.
For advocates of the CFA, `being discriminatory' must satisfy HR in order for the discriminatory
nature of society to be a cause of the wage gap. In other words, it must be possible for `being
discriminatory' to be assigned as a treatment to societies in some experiment. Is such an experiment
10I leave aside two implausible solutions: First, the solution which consists in claiming that the wage gap is a brute
fact, i.e. has no causal explanation. Second, the solution which consists in claiming that a society of the kind I've
described is impossible, and that As and Bs must dier in some respect other than their race in order for the wage
gap to arise.
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possible?
Holland attempts to justify his claim that it is by describing \a parallel world [. . . ] in which
things are so dierent that what we recognize in our own world as racial discrimination does not
exist in this other world." (2003, 16, emphasis original) Though Holland attempts to further esh
out this \little fantasy" (ibid.), his description falls far short of a precise description of a hypothetical
experiment. He does not specify, for instance, the hypothetical experimental manipulations involved
in making a society discriminatory.11
The claim that `being discriminatory' satises HR, and so might be a cause of the wage gap
between As and Bs, thus lacks proper justication while, as I argued in x4.2, there are good reasons
to think that race does satisfy HR. If HR is the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow, then,
there does not seem to be any good reason to favor Holland's alternative explanation of the wage
gap over the commonsensical explanation I presented above. And if, as I argued in x4.1, HR is not
the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow, then one can simply object to Holland that, absent
an account of what it means exactly for a society to be discriminatory, his proposed explanation
is little more than a vague suggestion while the commonsensical explanation given above clearly
identies a mechanism that is sucient to generate the wage gap between As and Bs. Whether
HR is the right rule for advocates of the CFA to follow, then, there are good reasons to favor the
commonsensical explanation over Holland's alternative.
The second alternative answer, defended by Greiner and Rubin (2011), among others, claims
that what causes As to receive lower wages is not their race in combination with the employer's belief
regarding the worth of their work, but the perception of their race by the employer in combination
with this same belief. There are several problems with this answer. I here examine three.
First, in the imaginary case at hand, it is simple enough to pin down who's perception it is
that's relevant to explaining the wage gap, since there is only one employer. But what if there
were many employers, and what if the wages of As were on average, rather than uniformly, 30%
lower than those of Bs? Who's perception would then be relevant? The collective perception of
all the employers? Or the collective perception of only those employers who falsely believe the
work of As to be worth less than that of Bs? If one is to appeal to perceptions of race to explain
any real wage gap between racial groups, then one needs answers to these questions. Greiner and
Rubin themselves point out the diculty of answering these questions as one limitation of this
approach (ibid., 783-784). And the problem is more severe even when one considers studies of the
eect of race on education or access to health care: What is the proper interpretation in terms of
perceptions of race of the causal eects estimated by these studies?
Second, if the move to perceptions is legitimate in the case of race, then why not adopt it for
other properties of units? Why not think that perceptions of education or work experience, rather
than education or work experience, are what's causally relevant to an individual's wages? The move
from race to perceptions of race seems ad hoc and motivated entirely by the assumption, which I
11It seems that, in order to describe such hypothetical experimental manipulations, one would rst have to pin
down what it means for a society to be (racially) discriminatory, something Holland does not do.
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have argued to be mistaken in x4, that race cannot be a cause according to the CFA.
Third, and this is the most pressing problem, what causes the employer in the imaginary society
I have described to perceive A workers to be As? If race is not a cause, then one cannot claim
that the cause at work is the fact that As are of race A. Leaving aside the implausible claim that
perceptions of race are uncaused, the most plausible solution seems to be to claim that what causes
the employer to perceive A workers to be As is the perception of some set of features F the presence
of which is strongly correlated with being a A. This solution faces a dilemma. Either the features
in set F constitute what it is to be an A, in which case being an A is, after all, a cause of the
employer's perception of As as As. Or the features in F do not constitute what it means to be a
A.
In this latter case, the belief the employer must have in order for the wage gap to appear is not
the belief that the work of As is worth less than that of Bs, but the belief that the work of units
exemplifying features F is worth less than the work of units which do not exemplify these features.
If this is so, then describing the discrimination against As as racial discrimination is inappropriate:
As are discriminated against not on the basis of their race but on the basis of features that happen
to be strongly correlated with being an A. More generally, this solution amounts to denying that
there can be genuinely racial (direct) discrimination, i.e. \dierential treatment on the basis of
race that disadvantages a racial group", as a panel of the US National Research Council denes it
(Blank et al., 2004, 39, emphasis original).
Neither the alternative explanation defended by Holland nor that defended by Greiner and
Rubin thus seem as satisfactory as the commonsensical explanation presented at the beginning of
this section, and which assumes race to be among the causes of the wage gap between As and Bs.
This provides some support for the claim that one needs to assume race to be a cause in order
to explain racial discrimination. Of course, the explanations oered by Holland and Greiner and
Rubin, though they are the most prominent alternatives in the literature (especially the latter), do
not exhaust the space of possible alternatives to the commonsensical explanation of the wage gap.
This is why, in the introduction to this paper, I described the discussion in the present section as
sketching an argument for race being a cause.
6 Conclusion
Are the attempts of labor economists to infer the causal eect of race on, e.g., wages \incoherent",
as Greiner and Rubin (2011, 775) claim? Is it the case that \Attributing cause to RACE is merely
confusing and unhelpful", as Holland (2003, 24) maintains? I have here argued that there is no
reason to think these claims to be true.
First, the argument advanced by advocates of the CFA against race being a cause is invalid.
Second, its key premise, that race is an attribute of units, is not justied by the application of
Holland's rule, a rule that advocates of the CFA should reject anyway. Third, there are good
reasons to think that explaining racial discrimination requires one to treat race as a cause.
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I have said nothing up to now about debates in the philosophy of race. The view defended in
this paper bears on these debates in the following way: Whatever concept of race one thinks is
t for use by labor economists studying racial discrimination, one's account of this concept should
imply that races can be causes.
The debate over the causal status of race examined in this paper also gives a useful example
of a case where philosophers of science can, and should, contribute to clarifying the debate and
critically examine the assumption made by the scientists involved. This is what I have tried to do
above.
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